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DIRECT AND INDIRECT BELIEF 
Curtis Brown 
I 
The word 'belief' is ambiguous, referring sometimes to what is believed, 
sometimes to the act or state of believing it. I believe that as I write this 
it is sunny outside. This belief is true. What is true is what I believe, 
namely that it is sunny, not my believing it. On the other hand, my 
belief that it is sunny is rational and unshakeable, and it played a causal 
role in my deciding not to wear a coat today. What is rational, 
unshakeable, and played a causal role is my believing a certain thing, 
not the thing I believe. I will say that what I believe is an object of belief, 
and that my believing it is a belief state. 
There is a parallel distinction between perceptual states and objects of 
perception. If Agnes sees an Angus, then one object of her perception is 
a cow, and she herself is in one of the perceptual states which can be 
gotten into by looking at a cow. If I say, "Agnes sees an Angus," then I 
am conveying two sorts of information: information about Agnes' 
perceptual state, and information about the object of her perception. In 
ascriptions of belief, too, we convey information both about the 
believer's state and about the object of his or her belief.1 
I take the moral of much-discussed examples due to Tyler Burge and 
Saul Kripke to be that the relation between one's belief state and what 
one believes is rather loose: one could be in the same belief state but 
have different objects of belief, and one can have the same objects of 
belief in virtue of being in different belief states (with qualifications to 
be noted later). In section II I explain why. 
I then suggest, following my paper "What is a Belief State?"2 that one's 
being in a particular belief state is nevertheless best characterized by a 
set of propositions, namely those one would believe in any situation in 
which one were in that belief state.3 I describe these propositions as 
one's immediate objects of belief. Many of the things we believe are not 
immediate objects of belief in this sense. So there is a distinction 
between two sorts of belief: one directly believes the propositions that 
are one's immediate objects of belief, and indirectly believes the rest of 
the propositions one believes. 
My main purpose in this paper is to develop and defend this distinction 
between direct and indirect belief. In section III, I sketch the nature and 
fill in some of the content of an account according to which our direct 
beliefs together with our circumstances determine the rest of our beliefs. 
Finally, in section IV, I apply the account to some puzzles about belief. 
I begin by characterizing belief states and objects of belief. The facts that 
determine what one believes may be divided into facts about the 
believer, on the one hand, and facts about the believer's environment, 
on the other. One's belief state consists of those facts solely about the 
believer that help determine what he or she believes. Being in a certain 
belief state is thus an intrinsic, nonrelational property of an individual.4 
The objects of our belief are the things we believe, just as the objects of 
perception are the things we perceive and the objects of desire are the 
things we want. What one believes may be true or false, depending on 
the way things are. So the objects of belief must be such that they have 
truth values, and such that they would have truth values, not 
necessarily the same ones, in various possible situations other than the 
actual one. An object of belief, then, must be something which 
determines a function from possible situations to truth values. So the 
simplest possible answer to the question what the objects of belief are is 
that they simply are the relevant functions.5 I shall, in accordance with 
one modern tradition, use the term 'proposition' to mean such a 
function; the simple answer to the question about the objects of belief is 
then that they are propositions.6 
Let us assume, then, that the objects of belief are propositions. Then the 
question arises, which propositions? Consider the following brief 
dialogue. "John believes that fluoridation is a communist plot." "What 
did you say he believes?" "That fluoridation is a communist plot." This 
reasonably natural short conversation seems to imply that there is 
something which John believes, and that this something is that 
fluoridation is a communist plot. 'That fluoridation is a communist plot' 
appears to be a singular term denoting what John believes. I propose to 
take this appearance at face value. So I will suppose that if 'x believes 
that S' is true, and proposition P = that S, then P is an object of x's 
belief.7 I will further suppose that 'that S' denotes P (in a context) just in 
case S expresses P (in that context). 
I have described the nature of belief states so briefly because I have 
discussed the issue in greater detail elsewhere. I have discussed the 
nature of the objects of belief so briefly because for my purposes here 
not much hinges on the details of an account of these objects. Different 
views about the nature of propositions, or about the semantics of belief 
sentences, would force reformulations of the points I will make, and for 
some purposes this could be very important: but the outlines of the case 
for the distinction between direct and indirect belief should be mostly 
independent of such details. 
II 
I take the moral of much recent writing on the propositional attitudes to 
be that belief states and many of the objects of belief are only 
contingently related. Many of the objects of an individual's belief do not 
characterize the belief state he or she is in essentially. This is because the 
belief states one is in supervene on one's intrinsic properties, while one 
has many of the objects of belief one does partly in virtue of facts about 
one's environment. One is in a given belief state independent of what 
situation one finds oneself in, except to the extent that the situation 
directly affects one's intrinsic properties; but one has many of the 
objects of one's belief only by virtue of the situation one is in. 
I will consider two much-discussed examples which illustrate this point 
in different ways. The first example is due to Tyler Burge,8 the second 
to Saul Kripke.9 The examples are by now so familiar that I will spend 
little space on their details or variations. 
In order to explain as clearly as possible what Burge's and Kripke's 
examples show, I need to introduce several notions. First, we need to 
distinguish between one's total object of belief and partial objects of 
belief. The total object of one's belief is simply the collection of all 
propositions which are objects of one's belief. Partial objects of one's 
belief are any objects of belief short of the total object of one's belief. 
When we speak of objects of belief, we typically mean partial objects of 
belief. 
One's total belief state, then, is what Daniel Dennett calls the 
"organismic contribution" to one's total object of belief.10 It is not clear 
whether there are also partial belief states. Let us call particularism the 
view that for any partial object of belief there is a partial belief state not 
identical with one's total belief state which is the complete organismic 
contribution to one's having that particular object. Particularism is 
opposed to holism, the view that one has any partial object of belief only 
in virtue of being in a total belief state: the view that belief states cannot 
be decomposed into parts. There are also intermediate views: for 
instance the view that some of our beliefs are "explicitly represented" or 
"core" beliefs, and that each proposition explicitly represented 
corresponds to a partial belief state, while obvious consequences of 
these beliefs, though still beliefs, do not have corresponding partial 
belief states.11 
Now, let us call the following view the Total Necessary Connection 
View: 
For any total belief state S, and for any total object of belief O, if 
one is in S and has O as one's total object of belief, then of 
necessity one is in S if and only if one has O as one's total object of 
belief. 
 
We could also express this as the view that, for any total belief state S 
and any total object of belief O, if one is in S and has O as one's total 
object of belief, then in any possible situation in which one is in S one 
has O as one's total object of belief, and in any possible situation in 
which one has O as one's total object of belief one is in S. Or again, we 
could say that if one's total belief state is fixed, then one's total object of 
belief is also fixed, and if one's total object of belief is fixed, then what 
total belief state one is in is also fixed. 
The Total Necessary Connection View divides into two sub-claims. The 
first I will call the claim of essential characterization: 
If one is in a total belief state S and has O as one's total object of 
belief, then of necessity if one is in S then one has O as one's total 
object of belief. 
 
That is, in any possible situation in which one is in S, one has O as one's 
total object of belief; fixing the state suffices to fix the object. I call this 
the claim of essential characterization because it amounts to the claim 
that determining a certain total object of belief is an essential 
characteristic of a belief state. 
 
The second sub-claim, the other half of the original biconditional, 
is the claim of complete characterization: If one is in a total belief 
state S and has O as one's total object of belief, then of necessity if 
one has O as one's total object of belief then one is in S. 
 
If the claim of complete characterization is correct then in any situation 
in which one has the total object of belief one in fact has, one will also be 
in the total belief state one is in fact in; fixing the object suffices to fix the 
state. 
If the particularist view that there are partial belief states is correct, then 
there are stronger versions of both parts of the Necessary Connection 
View. There is the strengthened claim of essential characterization, 
which holds that if one has a proposition as partial object of one's belief 
in virtue of being in a corresponding partial belief state, then of 
necessity if one is in that partial belief state one has that proposition as 
partial object of one's belief. And similarly there is the strengthened 
claim of complete characterization, which holds that if one has a 
proposition as partial object of one's belief in virtue of being in a 
corresponding partial belief state, then of necessity if one has that 
proposition as partial object of one's belief then one is in that partial 
state. However, Burge's example shows that the claim of essential 
characterization is false, and thus also that the strengthened claim of 
essential characterization is false. Kripke's example shows that the 
strengthened claim of complete characterization is false, but not that the 
weaker claim of complete characterization is false. Let us briefly 
consider these two examples. 
Hilary Putnam has argued that meanings "ain't in the head."12 Burge's 
argument is very similar to Putnam's; it may be understood as an 
attempt to show that beliefs are not in the head either. Burge asks us to 
consider someone of whom we would normally say that he believes that 
he has arthritis in his thigh. The individual--let us call him 'Art'--has 
learned English in the normal way and is now a competent English 
speaker; he has certain pains in his thigh which are in fact due to a 
rheumatoid ailment; and as a result of these pains he assents to the 
sentence "I have arthritis in my thigh." In such a situation it seems 
correct to say that Art believes that he has arthritis in his thigh--even 
though, as Burge points out, it is in fact impossible to get arthritis in the 
thigh. 
Call this situation "Situation 1". Now we are to imagine a counterfactual 
situation, Situation 2. In this second situation, Art is exactly the same as 
in Situation 1. Every episode in his history of language learning is the 
same, and he himself is in every intrinsic or nonrelational respect no 
different than in Situation 1. But his linguistic community is different: in 
Situation 2, 'arthritis' refers in Art's community not to arthritis but to 
rheumatoid ailments more generally. It refers, I will say, not to arthritis 
but to "arthritis". (The quotation marks here are scare quotes.) Now it 
seems that speakers in Situation 2 can correctly say "Art believes that he 
has arthritis in his thigh." But they do not mean by that sentence what 
we would mean by it. What they mean is rather that he believes he has 
"arthritis" in his thigh. Burge claims, plausibly, that in Situation 2 Art 
does not believe that he has arthritis in his thigh. He believes that he has 
"arthritis" in his thigh, but that is a belief in a different proposition. 
Before considering what conclusions to draw from Burge's example, let 
us pause to consider whether the example should be taken at face value. 
A natural response to the example is to assert that in Situation 1 Art 
does not, despite appearances, believe that he has arthritis in his thigh. 
Kent Bach has argued for this conclusion along the following lines.13 
Art does not associate the concept of arthritis with the term 'arthritis'. But 
assenting to the sentence "I have arthritis in my thigh" is not evidence 
that one has a belief about arthritis unless one associates the term 
'arthritis' with the concept of arthritis. So we have no reason to think Art 
believes he has arthritis in his thigh. (Burge invites this sort of criticism 
by claiming that Art has the concept of arthritis, and associates it with 
'arthritis', but incompletely understands the concept. Bach finds the 
notion of an incompletely understood concept mysterious, and suggests 
that we should say instead that Art associates with 'arthritis' 
a different concept which he does completely understand.) 
There are two main responses to be made here. First: Burge's example 
can be presented without making use of any views about concepts. (In 
particular, the example does not depend on Burge's view that one can 
possess a concept one incompletely understands.) The intuition which 
supports the view that Art believes he has arthritis in his thigh is rather 
strong, and is elicited by the bare description of Situation 1, without the 
aid of philosophical theories or technical notions. The notion of a 
concept, by contrast, has very little pretheoretical content. As far as I can 
see, the ordinary notion of concept permits any of the following views: 
(i) Art associates the concept of arthritis with the term 'arthritis', but 
incompletely understands this concept (Burge's view). (ii) Art associates 
with the term 'arthritis' a concept he does completely understand, but 
which is not the concept of arthritis. (Bach's view--but note that even on 
this view we could allow that Art believes he has arthritis in his thigh, by 
rejecting the idea that having the concept of arthritis is a necessary 
condition for having beliefs about arthritis. Similarly, we might want to 
allow that Fido believes his bone is buried in the back yard while 
denying that Fido possesses the concept of bone.) (iii) Art fully 
understands the concept of arthritis, and associates it with the term 
'arthritis', but the concept of arthritis does not determine the extension 
of 'arthritis'. (Putnam may hold something like this view.) (iv) There is 
no such thing as "the concept of arthritis," just the disease, a term that 
denotes it, and various degrees of competence in the use of this term. 
(Someone sceptical of the analytic-synthetic distinction might well hold 
this view.) 
If the ordinary notion of concept will not decide between such 
possibilities, Bach must be seen as advancing a theoretical account of 
the notion of a concept, and utilizing this account to counter a fairly 
strong linguistic intuition. This need not be a hopeless task, but at a 
minimum Bach's theory of concepts needs to be more fully described 
and motivated before it will give us grounds to reject the strong reaction 
that Art does believe he has arthritis in his thigh.14 
This brings me to the second response. Were a theory of concepts with 
the consequence that Art does not believe he has arthritis in his thigh to 
be developed, it seems likely that its consequences would be 
unacceptably sceptical. Bach concedes that we would normally say that 
Art believes this, and even that Art himself, once apprised of his 
mistake, would continue to assert that he had believed he had arthritis in 
his thigh. Moreover, Burge has persuasively argued that avery wide 
range of examples can be utilized to make the same point as the arthritis 
example. So it appears that Bach's view will involve rejecting, not just a 
few isolated intuitions, but a very great deal of what we would 
ordinarily say about people's beliefs.15 
I shall, then, continue to take Burge's example at face value. The moral 
of the example, I suggest, is that the objects of a person's belief are not 
fully determined by that person's intrinsic properties. The argument for 
this conclusion is simple. We have seen that in Situation 1, Art believes 
that he has arthritis in his thigh, and that in Situation 2, it is not the case 
that Art believes that he has arthritis in his thigh. From these facts 
together with my remarks in section I about the objects of belief, it 
follows that there is a proposition which is an object of Art's belief in 
Situation 1 but not in Situation 2. And from this intermediate conclusion 
together with the point that in both situations all the intrinsic, 
nonrelational facts about Art are the same, it follows that the intrinsic, 
nonrelational facts about Art do not fully determine what the objects of 
his belief are. What belief state Art is in is an intrinsic, nonrelational fact 
about him. So the example shows that the claim of essential 
characterization is false, and therefore also that the strengthened claim 
of essential characterization is false. 
We can put the conclusion of the argument in a suggestive way by 
introducing the notion of an immediate object of belief. It seems natural 
to say that in some sense, if Art is exactly the same in Situations 1 and 2, 
then he must believe exactly the same things in both situations. Burge's 
example shows that the sense in which this is true cannot be the 
ordinary one. But we can capture this somewhat special sense of 
believing as follows. Let us say that a proposition is an immediate 
object of Art's belief only if whether he has it is fully determined by the 
intrinsic, nonrelational facts about him. And let us say that 
Art directly believes that P if and only if the proposition that P is an 
immediate object of his belief. Then Burge has shown that many of the 
objects of our belief are not immediate objects of our belief, that is, that 
many of the things we believe are things we believe only indirectly. We 
might say that he has shown that a sort of naive realism about belief 
cannot be correct. 
I have intentionally adapted this terminology from the philosophy of 
perception. It is illuminating to consider Burge's result about the objects 
of belief in light of similar considerations about the objects of 
perception. It is enlightening and somehow liberating to find that the 
intrinsic facts about someone do not determine what the objects of his 
or her belief are. But it can also seem unpalatable and disturbing, and to 
alleviate this reaction it may be helpful to notice how obvious the parallel 
fact about perception is. For who would have thought that the intrinsic 
facts about me determine what the objects of my perception are? To take 
a classic example, suppose that I see a tomato, and thus that I have a 
tomato as object of my perception. Clearly there is a wide variety of 
possible situations in which the intrinsic facts about me are exactly the 
same and yet in which the object of my perception is very different: I 
could have been looking at a wax imitation of an apple, or at half an 
apple, or at a cleverly positioned photograph of an apple, or perhaps 
even at nothing at all, if my brain were being stimulated in the way it 
would be by seeing an apple. The intrinsic facts about me are not 
sufficient to determine what the objects of my perception are. 
It seems clear that in some sense the subject sees exactly the same thing 
in all of these situations. After all, the situations are perceptually 
indistinguishable for him; he has exactly the same visual experiences in 
all of them; in all of them he is in the same perceptual state. If we say 
that an object is an immediate object of perception only if the intrinsic 
facts about the observer determine what the object is, and that one 
directly perceives an object just in case it is an immediate object of one's 
perception, then such examples show that one may indirectly perceive 
different objects in situations in which exactly the same objects are 
directly perceived.16 
Perceptual ascriptions characterize states of the head only indirectly, by 
saying what one of the mediate objects of someone's perception is. I 
suggest that something directly analogous is true of belief ascriptions: 
they typically characterize belief states only indirectly, by saying what 
one of the mediate objects of someone's belief is. I will elaborate on this 
point later. 
I turn now to Kripke's example, which I will use to illustrate a point in 
some ways the converse of Burge's example. (Kripke's own use of his 
example is rather different; I will discuss it briefly in section IV.) The 
example goes roughly as follows.17 
Pierre is a normal French speaker who knows no English. He has heard, 
in French, of London, called by the French 'Londres', and on the basis of 
what he has heard he thinks that it is pretty, so he assents to the French 
sentence 'Londres est jolie'. It seems correct to conclude from this that 
Pierre believes that London is pretty. Later, Pierre moves to an 
unattractive part of London--without knowing that the city he is in is 
the city called by him 'Londres'. He learns English by the direct method, 
until ultimately he is as competent in the language as his English 
neighbors. He calls the city he lives in 'London', and thinks it very 
unattractive; so he assents to 'London is not pretty'. It seems correct to 
conclude that Pierre believes that London is not pretty. But Pierre still 
assents to 'Londres est jolie': he is unaware that 'Londres' and 'London' 
denote the same city. So Pierre believes that London is pretty, and 
Pierre believes that London is not pretty. These are inconsistent beliefs, 
and yet it seems unfair to accuse Pierre of inconsistency, since "he lacks 
information, not logical acumen." 
This example shows, though a little indirectly, that one may have a 
given proposition as (partial) object of one's belief in virtue of being in 
different (partial) states. Pierre entertains the same proposition--that 
London is pretty--positively in virtue of being in one partial belief state, 
and negatively in virtue of being in a different partial belief state. That 
the two states result in his taking opposite attitudes toward this 
proposition shows that they are distinct states. 
The example will more clearly illustrate my point if we suppose that 
Pierre actually moved to a lovely part of London and came to accept the 
sentence 'London is pretty'. Now Pierre believes twice over that London 
is pretty. Either the partial belief state he entered in France or the one he 
entered in England would by itself have resulted in his believing that 
London is pretty. And he could have entered either of these partial 
states without entering the other. Let us then imagine two possible 
situations. In S1 Pierre learns in France to accept 'Londres est jolie', but 
never moves to England. In S2 Pierre learns nothing of London in 
France, but does move to London and there comes to accept 'London is 
pretty'. In each situation Pierre is in a partial belief state which he is not 
in in the other; thus Pierre's total belief state is different in S1 than in S2. 
And yet in both situations he has the proposition that London is pretty 
as an object of his belief. 
This example shows that the sentence 'Pierre believes that London is 
pretty' does not characterize Pierre as being in any particular partial 
belief state. It characterizes him only as being in some one of the many 
partial belief states in virtue of which he could have the proposition that 
London is pretty as an object of his belief. It thus shows that the 
strengthened claim of complete characterization is false: fixing a partial 
object of belief does not suffice to fix a partial belief state. 
It is natural to wonder whether Kripke's example can be strengthened 
so as to show that even the weaker complete characterization claim is 
false: so as to show that one could have the same total object of belief in 
virtue of being in different total belief states. I believe that the example 
cannot be strengthened in this way. If all of someone's objects of belief 
are fixed, that is enough to fix one's total belief state. S1 and S2 are 
situations in which Pierre is in different total belief states and yet in 
which one of the partial objects of his belief is the same. But there are 
other partial objects of his belief which are different in the two 
situations. For instance, in S1 Pierre believes that the sentence 'Londres 
est jolie' is true, and thus has as a partial object of his belief the 
proposition that the sentence 'Londres est jolie' is true. But in S2 Pierre 
does not have this proposition as a partial object of belief. And I suspect 
that what is true in this example will be true in general: we will not be 
able to construct an example in which Pierre is in different total belief 
states in two situations and yet has all the same objects of belief in the 
two situations. 
Our conclusion so far is that there is a rather loose fit between belief 
states and objects of belief. Either can change independently of the 
other. But my last paragraph already suggests that there may be limits 
to this looseness and independence. I would suggest that there is a part 
or subset of one's total object of belief, namely one's 
total immediate object of belief, which really does characterize one's belief 
state essentially and completely, about which the Necessary Connection 
View is correct. 
I define the immediate objects of belief as those propositions one not 
only believes, but would believe no matter how much different one's 
situation were, provided that one were in the very same belief state. 
(Remember that having all the same intrinsic properties, physical and 
phenomenological and whatever others there might be, is sufficient for 
being in the same belief state.) Having so defined the immediate objects 
of belief I guarantee that one's total immediate object of belief 
characterizes one's belief state essentially, that is, that one's total 
immediate object of belief will be the same whenever one's belief state is 
the same. 
Of course, I cannot guarantee by definition that there are any immediate 
objects of belief. Why should we think that there are? I can provide only 
a schematic defense of this view here. I have three main reasons for 
supposing that there are immediate objects of belief, objects of belief 
which characterize one's belief state essentially. First: it seems clear that 
one's belief state provides a way of ordering a wide range of possible 
worlds. (Here I loosely follow Daniel Dennett.18) Given one's belief 
state, one is better suited to some worlds than to others: in some one's 
expectations are better met, and actions designed to satisfy one's desires 
more likely to do so, than in others. In particular, then, drawing a line 
somewhere, we may say that one's belief state determines the set of 
worlds to which one is best suited, and we can describe a belief state in 
terms of the worlds it determines in this way. On the view I am 
provisionally adopting, a set of worlds is a proposition. So it looks as 
though there must be a proposition which characterizes one's belief state 
essentially. Second: the intrinsic properties of an individual (or at least 
some of them, those captured by one's belief state) clearly play some 
sort of important role in determining what one believes. But what sort of 
role? If the relevant intrinsic properties are characterized semantically, 
in terms of things believed, it is easy to see how one's intrinsic states 
could combine in a principled way with one's context to yield the 
objects of one's belief; in the next section I will provide some candidates 
for the principles involved. But if one's intrinsic properties cannot be 
characterized intentionally, then it becomes very difficult to see how 
they determine what one believes.19 Third: there are some purposes for 
which objects of belief are essential, but for which mediate objects of 
belief will not serve. An account of the rationality of belief, for example, 
must be an account of the rationality of what is believed; we lose our grip 
on the notion of rationality if we talk about mental states in physical or 
syntactic terms. But examples like that of Kripke's Pierre, discussed in 
section IV, suggest that indirect objects of belief may always obscure the 
reasonableness of the mental states we are in. If we need to evaluate the 
rationality of belief in terms of the objects of belief, and cannot reliably 
do so in terms of mediate objects of belief, this gives us reason to think 
that there are immediate objects of belief. (I do not expect this brief 
defense of the existence of immediate objects of belief to be persuasive 
to the unconverted, but at least it suggests the lines along which I would 
hope to develop a fuller defense.) 
I now propose, first, to explain how one's mediate objects of belief are 
determined by one's immediate objects of belief plus context and, 
second, to put the resulting distinction between direct and indirect 
belief to work in thinking about some puzzles. 
III 
In section II, we considered the case of Art and his belief that he has 
arthritis in his thigh. In the articles in which he presents this and related 
examples, Tyler Burge draws from them the very general conclusion 
that no "individualistic" theory of the mental can be correct--that is, that 
no theory can account for such mental states as belief in terms solely of 
intrinsic properties of the subject. And Burge counts among 
individualistic theories Cartesianism, central-state materialism, and 
functionalism. 
Burge's example does indeed show that there is no true lawlike 
generalization of the form Art believes P iff C(Art), where C(Art) is a 
purely intrinsic characterization of Art. For there are at least some, and 
probably very many, replacements for P such that no matter what 
intrinsic characterization we fill in for C(Art), there will be possible 
situations in which C(Art) but Art does not believe P. The example 
shows this in particular for the case in which P is the proposition that 
Art has arthritis in his thigh. 
It is important to see that this sort of account is impossible. But this 
result need not be especially disturbing to functionalists or advocates of 
any of the other individualistic views Burge mentions. Compare the 
case of weight. An individualistic account of what weight I have is 
impossible, since I could have a very different weight even though all 
the intrinsic facts about me were exactly the same--if, for instance, I 
were on the moon instead of in Texas. But it is possible to give an 
individualistic account of that property of mine in virtue of which I 
have the weight I do, namely my mass, and then to give a very general 
account of what weight anyone with a given mass will have in any 
situation. It is my hope that the objects of belief are analogous to 
weights, and that beliefs themselves are analogous to masses; if so we 
may be able to give an individualistic account of what belief states one 
is in, and then give a general account of what the objects of belief will be 
in various circumstances of anyone who is in one of those belief 
states.20 
On this view, a full theory of belief should consist of an individualistic 
and a non-individualistic part. The individualistic part would be an 
account of belief states or of direct or immediate belief. It would have 
this form: 
Art directly believes P iff C(Art), 
where, as before, C(Art) is a purely intrinsic characterization of Art. The 
remaining component of a full theory would have this form: 
Art believes Q in S iff there is a P such that 
Art directly believes P and R(S,P,Q) 
where S is a situation and R(S,P,Q) is some relation whereby the 
proposition which Art directly believes and the situation he finds 
himself in together determine the proposition he mediately or indirectly 
believes. 
In "What is a Belief State?" I said a little, though hardly enough, about 
what sort of characterization C(Art) might be. In the present section I 
will try to say something about what sort of relation R(S,P,Q) might be. 
If I could completely characterize this relation, then I would have 
presented an explicit definition of belief in terms of direct belief. But it 
will be convenient to aim toward such a definition one clause at a time. I 
will here suggest what some of the needed clauses might look like. We 
want to know the conditions under which someone believes Q, for any 
proposition Q; I will suggest some such conditions but not all. 
A first clause is obvious: 
(1) If x directly believes Q, then x believes 
Q in any situation. 
Notice that in such principles as this I am presupposing that 'Art 
believes that S' is true just in case the proposition expressed by S is an 
object of Art's belief. If this view is too simplistic, then my quantifying 
over Q in 'x believes Q' is illegitimate; in that case principles like (1) 
would have to be modified in one of two ways. We might make them 
partial truth conditions for belief sentences, so that (1) would become 
something like (1'): If Q is an immediate object of x's belief, and S 
expresses Q, then 'x believes that S' is true. Or we might just provide a 
theory of the mediate objects of belief and then leave it an open question 
how the truth conditions of 'x believes that S' are related to the mediate 
objects of x's belief. In that case (1) would become something like (1''): If 
Q is an immediate object of x's belief, then Q is a mediate object of x's 
belief. 
A second needed principle is one which says, roughly, how de re belief 
depends on de dicto belief in conjunction with circumstances. More 
precisely, we need a principle which says how belief in a general 
proposition can in conjunction with circumstances result in belief in a 
singular proposition. De re belief has been the focus of a great deal of 
attention since Quine's early discussions of "quantifying in," and I have 
nothing novel to say on the subject. But I will borrow from David 
Lewis's account of de re belief21 to show what role such an account will 
play in the theory of belief I envision. Lewis's account gives rise, in the 
present context, to a clause something like this: 
If x directly believes the proposition that the 
F is G, and F is solely a relation of acquaintance 
to x, and, in situation S, the F = y, then, 
in S, x believes the proposition that y is G. 
Notice that this principle does not imply that one can believe a singular 
proposition only by virtue of believing a general proposition. To use the 
familiar (but misleading) terms, the principle does not imply that all de 
re belief is reducible to de dicto belief. I am inclined to believe (to put it 
crudely) that de re beliefs are always had by virtue of having de se beliefs, 
but that de se beliefs are not always had by virtue of having de 
dicto beliefs. But I need not defend this view here. 
To see how the principle works, consider the familiar case of 
someone, x, who believes the general proposition that the tallest spy is a 
spy. Suppose that in x's situation the tallest spy is Fred. Does the above 
principle direct us to attribute to x belief in the singular proposition that 
Fred is a spy? Clearly not. F in this case is 'tallest spy', and whether is 
acquainted with Fred is irrelevant to whether Fred is the tallest spy. 
Now consider a case in which x is standing in front of Fred and staring 
at him. Suppose that x forms the general belief, 'The person I see and 
who looks like this is a spy'. It seems clear that in this case x does believe 
that Fred is a spy, and our principle endorses this. F is 'person x sees 
who looks like this'--a property which is a relation of acquaintance to x. 
Problems lurk just beneath the surface here, and the term 'solely' is 
intended to meet them.22 For consider this case: suppose I saw two 
people this morning--first Adams, then Bates. I believe that the first 
person I saw this morning is a spy (and that the second is not). I also 
believe that the first person I saw this morning is bald. I infer that the 
spy I saw this morning is bald. But in fact, unknown to me, Adams 
is not a spy while Bates is. It seems clear that in this case I do not believe 
that Bates is bald in virtue of believing that the spy I saw this morning is 
bald. But I believe that the spy I saw this morning is bald, 'spy I saw this 
morning' is a relation of acquaintance with me, and the spy I saw this 
morning is Bates. The crucial point here is that 'spy I saw this morning' 
is a property which involves not only a relation of acquaintance but 
more as well. My seeing something is a relation of acquaintance 
between me and the thing, but something's being a spy is not. So F is 
not solely a relation of acquaintance to x. 
This example raises interesting issues about how to identify properties 
which are entirely relations of acquaintance. This seems to be difficult 
even in cases of direct visual perception, which one would expect to be 
among the easiest cases. For example, the Muller-Lyer arrow illusion 
shows that two lines of the same length can be made to appear to be of 
different lengths. One can even modify the illusion to make the shorter 
of two lines appear to be the longer. So a predicate like 'longest line I 
see' will not be a suitable F, on pain of counterexamples exactly parallel 
to the Adams-Bates example. (How about 'line which appears to me to 
be longest'? This seems to mean something like 'x such that x is a line 
and I believe that x is longer than any other line I see.' But this already 
attributes to me a de re belief about the line in question, and the 
conditions under which we have de re beliefs are precisely what our 
principle is supposed to explain. How about 'thing which 
produces these sensations in me'? This sort of description does not 
sufficiently discriminate between the many causes of my perceptual 
experiences. And anyway it is not a property nothing could have unless 
I were acquainted with it: perhaps I am a brain in a vat, and all my 
sensations are produced by a mad scientist. I need not be acquainted 
with the mad scientist in the relevant sense.) No doubt being the longest 
line I see mixes an acquaintance relation with something else. But it is 
very difficult to see how to cut away the "something else" and have 
enough left to provide a suitable F. But I cannot pause to pursue this 
issue here. 
I turn now to a third clause which has a metalinguistic element. In order 
to see the motivation for this clause, let us look yet again at Burge's 
example. We know that Art does not directly believe that he has 
arthritis in his thigh, since he is in exactly the same belief state in 
Situations 1 and 2 but believes that he has arthritis in his thigh only in 
Situation 1. Call the proposition that Art has arthritis in his thigh 'Q'. 
Any immediate object of Art's belief is a proposition he believes in both 
situations. We need a principle which tells us, for some proposition P, 
that anyone who believes P in Situation 1 believes Q in Situation 1, but 
which does not tell us the same thing about Situation 2. The principle 
has to be sensitive to the difference between Situations 1 and 2. 
But the only difference between Situations 1 and 2 in Burge's example is 
a difference in the speech practices of other members of Art's linguistic 
community, and as a result a difference in the meaning of the term 
'arthritis'. Since the only relevant difference between the two situations 
is a linguistic one, the desired principle has to appeal to linguistic facts. 
It will have to look something like this: If Art directly believes P, and 
'arthritis' means arthritis, then Art believes that he has arthritis in his 
thigh. Any such principle will clearly be silly unless P itself has 
something to do with the term 'arthritis'. 
Now Art does in fact have beliefs about the term 'arthritis' which hold 
constant across Situations 1 and 2. In particular, he believes that he has 
the disease called 'arthritis' in his thigh. And, given that Art is a normal 
English speaker, it seems plausible that it is in virtue of this 
metalinguistic belief that Art believes in Situation 1 that he has arthritis 
in his thigh and in Situation 2 that he has "arthritis" in his thigh. After 
all, what else could be responsible for these beliefs? 
Art's case can be accounted for by this principle: If Art immediately 
believes that he has the disease called 'arthritis' in his thigh, and is a 
competent user of the term 'arthritis', and in situation S 'arthritis' means 
arthritis, then, in S, Art believes that he has arthritis in his thigh. 
Somewhat more generally, we may say this: 
(3) If Art believes that a sentence R is true, and Art is a competent 
user of R, and, in situation S, R expresses proposition Q, then, in 
S, Art believes Q. 
 
In Situation 1 the sentence 'Art has arthritis in his thigh', or the sentence 
'I have arthritis in my thigh' as uttered by Art, expresses the proposition 
that Art has arthritis in his thigh; in Situation 2 the same sentence 
expresses the different proposition that Art has "arthritis" in his thigh; 
so the principle yields the results we need for the two situations. Note 
that competence admits of degrees: there are speakers of Art's language 
more competent than he in the use of 'arthritis'. The competence 
required for the principle is whatever minimal competence one needs in 
order for a sentence to be said to be part of one's language, or in order 
for one to be able to use the sentence to express or assert the proposition 
it expresses in one's linguistic community. If one understands an 
expression, one is a competent user of it, but perhaps not conversely; 
perhaps for instance Art's minimal competence in the use of 'arthritis' 
does not suffice for understanding. 
It is worth pausing to see that the present principle is not vulnerable to 
certain obvious objections to other sorts of metalinguistic account. The 
principle does not have the consequence that all we really have beliefs 
about are sentences. Art's belief that he has arthritis in his thigh is not 
about a sentence, although the deeper belief in virtue of which he 
believes this is. Nor does the principle have the consequence that we 
have all our nonlinguistic beliefs in virtue of deeper metalinguistic 
beliefs. Although Art's belief that he has arthritis in his thigh is 
mediated by a metalinguistic belief, his belief that he is hungry very 
likely is not. 
The principle also does not have the consequence that apparently 
object-level belief ascriptions really ascribe metalinguistic beliefs. The 
sentence 'Art believes that he has arthritis in his thigh' does not ascribe 
to Art belief in the proposition that the sentence 'Art has arthritis in his 
thigh' is true. We have a different sentence to perform that task, namely 
the sentence 'Art believes that the sentence "Art has arthritis in his 
thigh" is true.' And since the principle is not part of an analysis of belief 
sentences or ascriptions, it is not subject to counterexamples involving 
translation. 
Burge reports that one common reaction to his case is to deny that 
Art really believes that he has arthritis in his thigh. He really believes, it 
is claimed, only that the sentence 'Art has arthritis in his thigh' is true. 
Burge responds that Art may well have that metalinguistic belief, but 
that he also clearly has the object-level belief. On this point I agree with 
Burge. My point is just that Art has the object-level belief in virtue of 
believing that 'Art has arthritis in his thigh' is true. If he had no 
metalinguistic beliefs about the term 'arthritis', he would not have the 
object-level belief either. 
A fourth element in our account of the relation between mediate and 
immediate belief is suggested by a consideration of the lottery paradox, 
which initially seems to provide an objection to a view I will briefly 
defend in section IV, namely that we believe all the logical 
consequences of our immediate beliefs.23 Suppose I know of a lottery 
with a thousand tickets. It seems that I might well immediately believe, 
of any of those tickets, that it will not win. (If I cannot immediately 
believe that, I can at least immediately believe that the sentence 
'Ticket i will not win' is true, and this will give rise to the same 
difficulty.) But I have no special information about that particular ticket, 
so if I can immediately believe that it will not win I should be able to 
believe this of each of the tickets; that is, I should be able to immediately 
believe that ticket 1 will not win, that ticket 2 will not win, . . . , and that 
ticket 1,000 will not win. But then, since I believe all the consequences of 
my immediate beliefs, I believe that ticket 1 will not win and ticket 2 
will not win and . . . and ticket 1,000 will not win. If I also believe that 
tickets 1 through 1,000 are all the tickets there are, then I immediately 
believe that no ticket will win. But I don't believe that, immediately or 
otherwise. So some premise of the argument must have been mistaken, 
and it seems natural to pick on the one that says I believe all the 
conjunctions of things I immediately believe. 
Natural but mistaken. We should instead reject the view that I believe 
immediately that ticket i will not win. I immediately believe only 
propositions true in all the worlds to which I am best suited, and I am 
just as well suited to some world in which ticket i wins as to any world 
in which it does not. So I do not immediately believe that ticket i will not 
win.24 
Although I do not immediately believe that ticket i will not win, very 
likely I do, in the ordinary way, believe that it will not win.25 There 
must, then, be some principle which gets me from what I immediately 
believe to the mediate belief that ticket i will not win. None of the 
principles so far discussed will accomplish this, so there must be 
another. 
I suggest the following: 
(4) If P is true in more than n percent of the worlds in which 
my total immediate object of belief is true, then I 
(mediately) believe that P. 
 
I leave the value of n unfixed; presumably it will vary with context. 
Notice that even if there are infinitely many worlds in which my total 
immediate object of belief is true and ticket i wins, and infinitely many 
more in which my total immediate object of belief is true and 
ticket i does not win, this should not lead to difficulty in computing 
percentages. There are just as many even positive integers as positive 
integers; nevertheless half of the positive integers are even. Similarly, 
99.9% of the worlds to which I am best suited are worlds in which 
ticket i does not win. 
I do, then, believe mediately that ticket 1 will not win, that ticket 2 will 
not win, . . . , and that ticket 1,000 will not win. But we do not believe all 
the conjunctions of things we mediately believe. And in particular it 
seems unlikely that I believe the conjunction of all my beliefs that tickets 
will not win. Certainly this conjunctive belief cannot be arrived at in the 
same way the conjuncts were, since in none of the worlds to which I am 
best suited is it true that no ticket wins. 
If we had now specified all the conditions under which one believes 
that Q, then we could add a final clause to the effect that under no other 
conditions does one believe that Q; our "definition" or theory of belief 
would then be complete. But there are surely conditions other than 
those set forth here. For instance, our third clause appealed to the 
notion of competence in the use of a sentence. Competence in the use of a 
sentence presumably amounts to the belief that the sentence expresses a 
certain proposition, in circumstances in which it does express that 
proposition. This belief will usually be indirect. But it seems doubtful 
that the conditions mentioned so far are enough to explain what 
grounds these indirect beliefs. So I must leave this account of the way 
direct belief determines indirect belief as an incomplete sketch. 
IV 
There are several puzzles about belief, cases in which powerful 
considerations seem to support each of two inconsistent theses about 
belief. I would suggest that in several such cases one of the theses is true 
of direct belief, one of indirect belief; thus we can respect the intuitions 
behind the apparently conflicting theses without contradiction. I will 
discuss a few of these puzzles rather briefly; my aim is to suggest areas 
in which the distinction I have been defending may be useful, not to 
provide fully worked-out analyses of the puzzles. 
Let us begin with Kripke's puzzle. The puzzle begins with the example 
of Pierre, which in section II I modified to make a point of my own. The 
puzzle is this: on the one hand, there is good reason to attribute to 
Pierre inconsistent beliefs, beliefs which cannot be true together. Our 
ordinary practices of belief ascription lead us to say that Pierre believes 
that London is pretty (in virtue of accepting, and understanding, 
'Londres est jolie'), and Pierre believes that London is not pretty (in virtue 
of accepting, and understanding, 'London is not pretty'). These two 
propositions are incompatible. On the other hand, we also seem to have 
good reason not to ascribe incompatible beliefs to Pierre: he has made no 
logical blunders, and cannot discover by introspection that his beliefs 
cannot be true together. As Kripke puts it, it seems that we cannot 
"convict Pierre of inconsistency."23 
Convicting Pierre of inconsistency might involve one of two things: 
showing that he has inconsistent beliefs, in the sense of 'objects of 
belief', or showing that he deserves to be criticized for the belief state he 
is in. Showing the former does not suffice to show the latter. 
I suggest that we agree that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs in the first, 
weak, sense. That is, he has two propositions as objects of his belief 
which cannot be true together: the proposition that London is pretty, 
and the proposition that London is not pretty. But the sting of 
acknowledging this may be lessened by the recognition that these 
propositions are not immediate objects of his belief, that they do not 
characterize his belief state essentially. Pierre could be in exactly the 
same belief state and yet not have inconsistent objects of belief--if for 
instance there were a British city other than London which the French 
called 'Londres', and it was this other city which Pierre had heard of as 
'Londres' in France.26 That Pierre's beliefs are inconsistent is a result not 
only of his belief state but also of facts about the world. But it would be 
wrong to criticize Pierre for such facts as that 'Londres' names London 
rather than some other city. If he were involved in inconsistencies 
which stemmed only from his own belief state, then he should indeed 
be criticized, but no such inconsistencies are involved in Kripke's 
example. 
Pierre believes that London is, and that it is not, pretty in virtue of a 
variety of deeper beliefs, including the belief that the city called 
'London' is not pretty and the belief that the city called 'Londres' is 
pretty. If I am right then some such propositions, the immediate objects 
of his belief, do characterize his belief state essentially; if they were 
inconsistent then something would be seriously wrong with his belief 
state. But the deeper beliefs by virtue of which Pierre has beliefs about 
London are not inconsistent. 
Kripke's puzzle is one of several reasons that have led various writers to 
argue that we cannot rationally believe the impossible. I have argued 
elsewhere that their reasons are not persuasive with respect to indirect 
belief, but do give good grounds for thinking it cannot be the case that a 
fully rational agent directly believes the impossible.27 
Another puzzle is also due to Kripke. There are strong reasons for 
supposing that any matter of contingent fact can be known only a 
posteriori or with the aid of experience. But Kripke has provided 
purported examples of contingent truths which can be known a priori. 
What sort of thing can be known a priori? Knowledge we have a priori is 
knowledge we have independently of experience. But not necessarily 
independently of all experience: things we know solely in virtue of 
knowing our language are generally considered to be known a 
priori even though experience is required in order to come to know one's 
language. We can construct a partial inventory of things known a 
priori as follows: (i) If I know P solely in virtue of knowing my language, 
then I know P a priori; (ii) If I know P a priori, and I know that P implies 
Q, and I know Q, and I have come to believe Q on the basis of my 
beliefs that P and that P implies Q, then I know Q a priori; (iii) Anything 
I know solely in virtue of knowing things a priori is something I know a 
priori. 
An argument that we cannot know (nonlinguistic) matters of contingent 
fact a priori might run like this: if a true proposition P is contingent, then 
it is made true by some matter of fact. Now whenever I know a 
proposition, what makes the proposition true must play a role in my 
coming to believe it, so if I know that P then some matter of fact must 
have played a role in my coming to believe P. I believe the things I do in 
virtue of the belief state I am in. But the only way a matter of fact can 
affect my belief state is by way of experience. So I cannot come to know 
P independently of experience.28 
But now consider the following purported example of a contingent 
truth which we know a priori, taken from Fred Kroon:29 "If in the world 
as it actually is the planets revolve around the sun, then the planets 
revolve around the sun." I take this example rather Kripke's because it 
seems to avoid criticisms which have been raised with regard to 
Kripke's own examples.30 Kroon writes of this example that "it is 
clearly a priori, for no one needs recourse to actual bits of experience to 
know that if in the actual world the planets revolve around the Sun, then 
is it true that they revolve around the sun. And it is contingent, for, 
while true in the actual world, in worlds in which Ptolemaic astronomy 
holds the consequent is false while the antecedent, being necessarily 
true, is again true, leaving the entire proposition false at those worlds." 
Once we distinguish between mediate and immediate objects of belief, I 
would suggest, the apparent conflict between the argument and the 
example disappears. The argument shows that we cannot 
have direct or immediate a priori knowledge of contingent fact, while the 
example establishes only the possibility of indirect or mediate a 
priori knowledge of contingent fact. 
Consider first the argument. The final premise is that the only way a 
matter of fact can affect my belief state is by way of experience. Let us 
suppose that this is correct. Nevertheless, while affecting my belief state 
is the only way to affect what I directly believe, it is not the only way to 
affect what I believe indirectly. A difference in my situation can make a 
difference to what I believe without making any difference to my belief 
state. In the case of indirect a priori knowledge of P, the necessary role of 
extra linguistic fact in my believing P need not involve directly affecting 
my belief state. So the argument shows that direct a priori knowledge of 
contingent facts is impossible, but not that indirect a priori knowledge of 
such facts is impossible. 
The example does not conflict with the argument so understood. We 
come to know the proposition that if the planets actually revolve 
around the sun, they revolve around the sun, I suggest, as follows. We 
know that for any sentence S, 'Actually S if and only if S' is true. We 
know this simply in virtue of knowing English, so we know it a priori. 
We similarly know a priori that 'The planets revolve around the sun' is a 
sentence, and we know that these two facts imply that 'If the planets 
actually revolve around the sun, they revolve around the sun' is true: so 
we also know a priori that this latter sentence is true. If we know the 
language, we know a priori what this sentence means. 
Now, all the a priori knowledge mentioned so far may well be direct, 
but, given purely linguistic fact, none of it is contingent. (That 
expressions mean what they do is a contingent matter, but, given that 
they mean what they do, it is necessary for instance that 'Actually S iff S' 
is true.) The next step is the one that gives us a priori knowledge of 
contingent fact, but the knowledge resulting from this step is no longer 
direct. For the next step is to apply clause (3) in the account of indirect 
belief given in section III. Given that I believe that 'If the planets actually 
revolve around the sun, they revolve around the sun' is true, and 
understand what it means, and given that it expresses the proposition 
that if the planets actually revolve around the sun, they revolve around 
the sun, clause (3) asserts that I also believe the proposition that if the 
planets actually revolve around the sun, they revolve around the sun. 
And, according to my partial inventory of a priori knowledge, this belief, 
if it counts as knowledge, is knowledge a priori. 
It must be admitted that indirect knowledge a priori is quite a weak 
notion. If I believe a proposition indirectly, then there is a possible 
world in which I am in the same belief state but do not believe that 
proposition. Suppose things had been different: suppose that the 
planets revolved around the sun, and I were in exactly the same belief 
state I am in fact in, but something else were drastically different--that 
China had only half as many people, say, or that our whole galaxy had 
popped into existence fifty years ago. The proposition we are 
considering would still have been true, but I would not have known it a 
priori, in fact would not even have believed it. I would instead know a 
priori a different proposition--the proposition expressed in that possible 
world by the sentence 'If the planets actually revolve around the sun, 
then they revolve around the sun'. It will rightly be felt that a 
priori knowledge I would not have in some worlds in which the 
proposition actually known remains true and I remain in the same belief 
state is somehow lacking. 
In addition to rejecting the traditional view that one cannot know 
contingent truths a priori, Kripke has also rejected the view that we 
cannot come to know necessary truths a posteriori. I have elsewhere 
defended his rejection of this view, but have suggested that those 
necessary truths we know a posteriori we typically also know a priori. I 
have also suggested that we cannot come to directly believe a necessary 
truth on the basis of a posteriori evidence.31 
A third puzzle concerns belief and logical consequence. It seems 
obvious that we do not believe all the logical consequences of things we 
believe. For instance, we sometimes try to convince others of the truth 
of propositions dear to us by showing them that the propositions in 
question are logical consequences of things they already believe. But if 
they believed all the logical consequences of things they believe, and the 
proposition in question really followed from their beliefs, then it seems 
they would believe it already and would need no convincing. 
On the other hand, it can seem incredible that we could fail to believe all 
the logical consequences of our beliefs, especially if we are committed to 
the possible-worlds view of propositions. On this view, to believe a 
proposition, say P, is to locate oneself as being in one of a set of possible 
worlds, the set of worlds at which P is true. Now any logical 
consequence of P, say P or Q, is true at a set of worlds which includes 
the set at which P is true, so to believe P or Q is to locate oneself as 
being in one of the worlds in the larger set. But surely if I have located 
myself as being in one or other of the worlds in the smaller set, I have 
already thereby located myself as being in one or other of the worlds in 
any set which includes the smaller set! Or, to put the matter slightly 
differently, the information that P includes the information that P or Q, 
so if I have the information that P then I already have the information 
that P or Q.32 
I suggest tentatively that this puzzle is to be resolved as follows. We do 
not believe all the logical consequences of things we believe. But we do 
believe all the logical consequences of things we directly or immediately 
believe. 
I am inclined to regard direct belief as holistic--to suppose that at root 
there is just one big immediate belief, roughly the proposition true at 
those worlds to which one is best suited, and that one's partial 
immediate objects of belief are just all the logical consequences of one's 
total immediate object of belief. One's partial immediate objects of belief 
may not have psychological reality in the way one's total immediate 
object of belief does: it may be that the only way to say what someone's 
partial immediate objects of belief are is by reference to that person's 
total immediate object of belief. One's total immediate object of belief is 
a seamless whole. One's total object of belief, on the other hand, is a 
grab-bag or hodgepodge of propositions believed in various ways and 
in virtue of different features of oneself and one's environment. The 
grab-bag is not closed under logical implication, but the seamless whole 
is. 
It may be that talk of logical consequence in this context is misleading: it 
may suggest incorrectly that the objects of belief are sentences. For 
consider this account of what logical consequence is: Q is a logical 
consequence of P just in case 'if P, then Q' is logically true; and this in 
turn may mean that 'if P, then Q' is true solely in virtue of its (logical) 
form. But if we understand logical consequence in this way we must 
take P and Q to be sentences rather than propositions, since 
propositions as I understand them have no form. They are just bits of 
information or sets of worlds. In this sense of logical consequence, 
beliefs do not have logical consequences. 
There is a related notion, call it '*logical consequence', which does apply 
to propositions. If we identify propositions with the sets of worlds in 
which they are true, then proposition Q is a *logical consequence of 
proposition P just in case P is a subset, not necessarily proper, of Q. Use 
of this notion can easily be extended to sentences; sentence R is a 
*logical consequence of sentence S just in case the proposition expressed 
by R is a *logical consequence of the proposition ex-pressed by S. But 
logical consequence and *logical consequence must be kept carefully 
distinct: 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is a *logical consequence, but not a 
logical consequence, of 'Hesperus is Hesperus'. 
It may in part be confusion on this point which makes it seem so 
obvious that we need not believe logical consequences of our beliefs. 
Though our beliefs do not have logical consequences, some of our 
beliefs are about sentences, which do. So when we say e.g. that someone 
believes all the axioms of a formal system but not all the theorems, even 
though the theorems are logical consequences of the axioms, we may 
well be thinking of the axioms and theorems as sentences and have in 
mind that he believes of all the axioms but not of all the theorems that 
they are true. One can believe the necessary truth without believing, of 
some sentence which expresses it, that the sentence is true. 
These remarks may suggest the following objection to the view that we 
believe all the *logical consequences of our immediate beliefs. I suppose 
that we can directly believe that sentences are true. But then suppose 
that I directly believe that the axioms of a system of logic are true and 
that its rules of inference are correct. It seems that for any theorem, it is 
a *logical consequence of my beliefs that the theorem is true, but it is 
clear that I do not believe of all theorems that they are true. For 
concreteness, let us take a very simple example. Suppose I were to 
directly believe that 'Grass is green' is true, and that the rule of 
inference: from Q, infer if P, then Q is correct. Then it would be a 
*logical consequence of my direct beliefs that 'If the moon is square, 
then grass is green' is true. Yet it seems that I could have the former 
beliefs without the latter, and this will seem even clearer in more 
complicated cases. 
I would suggest in response that we need to look more closely at the 
supposed direct belief that the rule of inference is correct. Just what is it 
to believe that a rule of inference is correct? I suggest that in the present 
case it comes to this: to believe that the rule is correct is to believe that 
for any sentences R and S, if S is true then 'if R, then S' is true. My 
tentative suggestion is that we cannot directly believe a generalization of 
this sort unless we directly believe all its instances. I may be disposed to 
work out proofs in accordance with the rule of inference, I may believe 
that a sentence which expresses the proposition that it is a correct rule 
of inference is true, I may indirectly believe that it is correct, but unless I 
directly believe all its instances I do not directly believe that it is correct. 
So the objection fails because the story it tells is incoherent. 
Now suppose that I am correct in thinking that we believe all the 
*logical consequences of our direct beliefs. It does not follow that we 
believe all the *logical consequences of all the things we believe. 
Consider again the case of Pierre. It is a *logical consequence of his 
indirect beliefs that there is a city which is both pretty and not pretty. 
Nevertheless he need not believe this, and no doubt does not. For 
neither this proposition nor any other in virtue of which he could 
believe it need be a *logical consequence of his direct beliefs, of for 
instance his beliefs that 'Londres est jolie' is true and that 'London is not 
pretty' is true. 
We have now seen how Burge's and Kripke's examples show that most 
of the objects of our belief are not immediate, and also why this does 
not rule out the possibility that there are immediate objects of belief. We 
have seen how a two-tiered conception of belief might go, a conception 
in which we first explain how one's direct beliefs are determined by 
one's intrinsic properties and then explain indirect belief in terms of 
direct belief plus circumstances. And we have seen how the resulting 
distinction between direct and indirect belief is of use in thinking about 
some familiar puzzles. I hope this is enough to make the present sort of 
account seem worth pursuing.33 
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